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A NYONE WHO SUPPLIES A CHATTEL for use or custody or posses-
sion by another incurs some duties arising out of the trans-
action.1 "No one may with impunity hand over a chattel to an-
other for any purpose when he knows that the chattel is un-
reasonably dangerous for that purpose and should know that the
danger is likely to pass unnoticed or unremedied by the other.
In such a case the supplier owes some duty of care to prevent
the injury, at least by taking reasonable steps to disclose the
danger to the person to whom he furnishes the chattel." 2
Negligence of the Retailer
The retailer, like any other supplier, will be liable for failure
to take reasonable steps to prevent injury from a known danger
in the article sold, when he should know that the danger is likely
to pass unnoticed or unremedied by the buyer or others who
might use the article.
Today, when canned, sealed, or packaged goods are com-
monly bought from a reputable supplier and resold in the original
package, the retailer generally has no reason or opportunity to
inspect the contents of the package. If the defect is hidden by the
container and nothing on the outside suggests trouble to the or-
dinary dealer, there can hardly be contributing negligence in
failing to discover the defect. Even in other situations, the duty
to inspect has been denied. "The basis of the liability is the
seller's superior knowledge and concealment of the latent de-
fects. When this knowledge is with the buyer and the defect is
unknown to the seller, the latter is not liable." a In Garvey v.
A. I. NamM, 4 where the plaintiff was injured by a needle pro-
* BA-. in Government, Denison University; Assistant Purchasing Agent
for United Food Management Services, Inc., and a second-year student at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 See Restatement of Torts, Sections 388-390, especially Sec. 388, Comment c.
2 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, 1537-1538 (1956).
3 Tourte v. Horton Manufacturing Co., 108 Calif. App. 22, 290 P. 919, 920
(1930). See also: 65 C. J. S. 635, Negligence, Sec. 100; Kirkland v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 233 Ala. 404, 171 So. 735 (1936); Sears,
Roebuck and Company v. Marhenke, 121 F. 2d 598 (9th C. C. A. 1941).
4 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. S. 442 (1910). See also: Sinatra v. National
X-Ray Products, 26 N. J. 546, 141 A. 2d 28 (1958).
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truding from the seam of a flannel dressing gown newly pur-
chased at the defendant's department store, it was held that the
defendant was liable for its failure to use reasonable care in in-
specting the garment. The duty to use reasonable care "requires
the seller to discover defects which may be found by inspection
alone, as distinguished from dangers so concealed that mechanical
tests are needed to disclose them." 5
However, when the retailer acts as more than a mere con-
duit of goods, additional circumstances may impose on him a
duty of inspection or testing. If the retailer maintains a sales
and service department and undertakes to inspect and test his
goods as part of his sales program, he will be held liable for
failure to discover a defect which would have been revealed by
the use of reasonable care. "The defendant took upon itself for a
consideration the duty of demonstrating and adequately testing
an electric wringer, whose failure to function in an emergency,
as the defendant had given plaintiff reason to believe it would,
indicates that the test was negligently made, and that this negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the proven injuries." 6 When
a secondhand automobile dealer sells a car as reconditioned, he
is liable to the party injured if, by using reasonable care, the
defect would have been noticed.7 If a dealer uses an article for a
purpose not intended by the manufacturer, he must use care to
ascertain its fitness for that purpose. In O'Donnell v. Asplundh
Tree Expert Company, where the dealer used a hook manufac-
tured for use with harness equipment to sustain the weight of a
man's body in tree clearance work, the court said: "Reasonable
care requires that the article so chosen be constructed as to
perform the task to which it is dedicated .... He was therefore
under a duty to ascertain that the article was made of proper
raw materials and was so manufactured as to sustain the weight
of a man's body." 8
5 Santise v. Martins, Inc., 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 741, 743 (1940).
6 Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323, 329 (1938). See
also: Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 388 Pa. 499, 131 A.
2d 600 (1957); Miszczak v. Maytag Chicago Company, 11 111. App. 2d 496,
138 N. E. 2d 52 (1956); Fleming v. John Deere Plow Company of Syracuse,
158 F. S. 399 (D. C. Pa. 1958).
7 Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F. 2d 373 (8th Cir. 1939); Banker v.
Packard Motor Car Co., 297 Ill. App. 645, 17 N. E. 2d 987 (1938); McLeod v.
Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N. W. 479 (1940); Bock v. Truck and
Tractor, Inc., 18 Wash. 2d 458, 139 P. 2d 706 (1943); Kothe v. Tysdale, 233
Min. 163, 46 N. W. 2d 233 (1951); Thrash v. U-Drive-It Company, 93 0. A.
388, 113 N. E. 2d 650 (1951); Stout v. Madden, 208 Or. 360, 300 P. 2d 461
(1956).
8 13 N. J. 319, 99 A. 2d 577, 587 (1953).
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A dealer's statements about an article may constitute negli-
gence regardless of whether or not such statements also amount
to a warranty. For example, in Rulane Gas Co. v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.,9 Montgomery Ward sold a water heater to Rulane
with the assurance that it could be used with rulane gas. The
gas company, with knowledge from the tag on the heater itself
that it was not originally designed for such use, made the adjust-
ments for gas use and installed the heater. After the heater had
been in use for some time, the pilot light went out, and gas con-
tinued to fill the room. A gas company service man, instead of
using a blower to dispel or dilute the gas first, lit a match, re-
sulting in an explosion and death of plaintiff's intestate. The
court held that Montgomery Ward's negligence was insulated
by the subsequent intervention of the active negligence of the
gas company's service man. Similarly, it was held to be negli-
gence to prepare meat containing pork scraps and label it "lamb
patties" with knowledge that a consumer might fail to cook it
sufficiently to destroy trichinae.'0 The gist of liability in such
cases is not deceit but rather that the statements carry an un-
reasonable threat of physical harm to the consumer.
The dealer's negligence extends to anyone who might fore-
seeably have been expected to be injured by the defect."
Strict Liability of the Retailer
A retailer's strict liability for injury caused by defective
articles arises out of: (1) a warranty that the goods are reason-
ably fit for the particular purpose of the buyer, when he makes
that purpose known to the seller and it appears that the buyer
relies on the seller's skill or judgment; and (2) a warranty of
merchantable quality, when goods are bought by description from
one who deals in goods of that description. Merchantability is in-
creasingly recognized as including a warranty of fitness for usual
purposes. "The warranty of fitness for the buyer's particular pur-
pose is implied only when the seller has knowledge of that pur-
pose and the buyer relies on the skill or judgment in the furnish-
ing of goods fit for that purpose. These elements are generally not
considered prerequisites to the general warranty of merchantable
9 231 N. C. 270, 56 S. E. 2d 689 (1949). See also: Ashley v. Jones, 246 N. C.
442, 98 S. E. 2d 667 (1957).
10 Russell v. First Natl. Stores, Inc., 96 N. H. 471, 79 A. 2d 573 (1951). See
also: Pineau v. White, 101 N. H. 119, 135 A. 2d 716 (1957).
11 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2, 1599.
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quality." 12 In application, warranty of fitness for the particular
purpose and warranty of merchantable quality are related and
often overlap. "From the simple proposition, first announced by
Lord Ellenborough in 1815, that a dealer who contracts to sell
goods of a particular description is understood to agree that he
will deliver what is commonly sold in the market under that de-
scription, the courts have developed the implied warranty of mer-
chantable quality. It has grown, by degrees, to include not only
genuineness according to the description and saleability in the
market, but also fitness for the ordinary uses and purposes for
which such goods are made and sold, and freedom from all de-
fects which will interfere with sale or use." 13 A warranty theory
is more often available in these cases, because the injured person
is more often in privity with the retailer than with the maker.
"Moreover, negligence is often absent in the retailer's case (as in
sealed container cases), and it always constitutes an additional
hurdle in the way of recovery." 14
The main controversy concerning the retailer's liability con-
cerns the question of whether or not he warrants the fitness of
products obtained from reputable suppliers and sold in their
containers, when the buyer realizes that the seller could not and
did not inspect the contents. "Probably the majority of Ameri-
can courts (both at common law and under the Sales Act) now
hold the retailer strictly on his warranty." 15 In Sencer v. Carl's
Market, 6 it was held that a retail dealer in food products sold
in sealed packages or cans to consuming public is liable on the
theory of implied warranty for injuries sustained by a purchas-
ing consumer because of deleterious, unwholesome or unfit sub-
stance for human consumption contained in package or can.
Another case held a retailer of cosmetics, such as home perma-
nent wave preparations, as well as of food, impliedly warrants
wholesomeness thereof, whether they are prepared by retailer or
are canned, bottled or otherwise sealed products of another. 17
12 Comment, 32 Texas L. Rev. 557, 560 (1954). See, a recent illustration:
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 883 (1958).
13 Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Minn. L.
Rev. 117, 167 (1943).
14 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2.
15 Harper and James, op. cit. supra n. 2, 1599-1600.
16 Sencer v. Carl's Market, 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla., 1950). See also: Food
Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla., 1957); Martin v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 301 Ky. 429, 192 S. W. 2d 201
(1946).
17 Higbee v. Giant Food Shopping Center, 106 F. S. 586 (D. C. Va. 1952).
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Some courts deny recovery because of the fact that the customer
could not have relied on his seller's skill and judgment in inspect-
ing the contents, since inspection by him was impossible. "It seems
to me that it would be unreasonable to say that, at the time of the
purchase here, the vendee relied upon the superior knowledge of
the vendor; but it must be assumed that both parties knew, and
must have necessarily known, that the vendor was entirely ig-
norant of, and without means of ascertaining, the condition of
the article sold, and that the means of inspection were as much
open to the purchaser as the vendor."'8
The argument for the majority view is evidence of the strict
nature of warranty at common law and the broad terms of the
Sales Act, which surely do not suggest an exception for latent
defects. Reliance on the seller may be found in the customer's
reliance on the retailer's skill and judgment in selecting his
sources of supply. "The customer at a retail store is ordinarily
bound to rely upon the skill and experience of the seller in de-
termining the kind of canned goods which he will purchase, un-
less he demands goods of a definite brand or trade-name." 19
Harper and James urge even broader considerations. "The
retailer should bear this as one of the risks of his enterprise.
He profits from the transaction and is in a fairly strategic posi-
tion to promote safety through pressure on his supplier. Also,
he is known to his customers and subject to their suits, while
the maker is often unknown and may well be beyond the process
of any court convenient to the customer." 20 The retailer is able
to pass the loss back to his supplier, either through negotiation
or legal proceedings. The retailer's
legal right to sue the person with whom he has dealt-the
wholesaler or producer-is absolutely clear; not like the
somewhat uncertain rights of his customer to sue the same
person. He is entitled to recover all that his customer has
recovered from him-at least if he has notified the producer
to come in and defend the suit-and also his legal expense,
and in some cases, compensation for injury to his good will.
18 Julian v. Laubenberger, 16 Misc. 646, 38 N. Y. S. 1052, 1055 (1896); Bow-
man Biscuit Company of Texas v. Hines, 151 Tex. 370, 251 S. W. 2d 153
(1952).
19 Ward v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 120 N. E. 225,
226 (1918). See also: Poulos v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Boston, 322 Mas.
386, 77 N. E. 2d 405 (1948); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24
C. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944); Baum v. Murray, 23 W. 2 890, 162 P. 2d
801 (1945).
20 Harper and James, op. cit., supra n. 2, 1600.
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Indeed, under modern practice, the customer frequently is
permitted to make both the retailer and producer parties
defendant. Where this is done, or where the dealer himself
brings in the producer, the rights between those parties can
be adjusted and the- dealer promptly compensated for his
loss.
It may also be noted that the retailer will rarely have to
sue the producer or wholesaler. The threat of cutting off
further business relations with him, plus the inevitable dam-
age to his good will, will ordinarily induce the producer or
wholesaler to make any settlement, within reason, which
the retailer demands, without the necessity of the latter go-
ing into court to enforce his rights.
2 1
With the ever-increasing dependence of the consumer on his
retailer to supply the consumer's needs, the increasing impor-
tance of implied warranties is clearly seen. It is for the retailer
to see that the goods which he sells are suitable for the use and
purpose which the consumer will make of them. Failure to
offer suitable merchandise should carry with it liability for the
resulting loss suffered by the consumer. "The reason for impos-
ing such a liability upon the seller is that the circumstances of
the bargain justify the buyer in inferring that the seller by the
very act of offering his goods for sale, asserts or represents that
they are merchantable articles of their kind or are fit for some
special purpose, and that the buyer relies upon this implied as-
sertion or representation." 22 The burden may be heavy, but
this is one of the hazards of the business.
Liability of the Wholesaler
The liability of sellers of goods to their immediate vendees
and the liability of manufacturers to the ultimate consumer
have been the subject of much legal thought. However, little
attention has been given to the liability of the other member of
the merchandising chain, the wholesaler, who is neither retailer
nor manufacturer, but who serves as a distributive link between
the manufacturer and the retailer.
The wholesaler is the most elusive of all the sellers the con-
sumer might want to reach. Because he does not deal directly
with the consumer, he is protected from conventional warranty
21 Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products, 23
Minn. L. Rev. 585, 605-606 (1939).
22 Williston on Sales, Secs. 231, 591 (Rev. ed. 1948).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/6
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
actions by the lack of privity. "Nor do we think a recovery based
upon warranty can be sustained.... It arises out of contract, and
cannot be asserted against one with whom the plaintiff has had
no contractual relations. The appellant is a stranger to the
respondents so far as any contract goes, and has made no war-
ranty upon which the respondents can rely." 23 Since he does not
create the product, which is usually packaged, he is relatively
immune from an action for negligence. "There may be cases
where the presence of a dangerous ingredient in the article sold
may in itself justify an inference of negligence on the part of
the defendant. But such an inference is not warranted where
a merchant deals in an article not generally regarded or known
to be dangerous and simply sells it in the condition in which
he buys it, without any reason to suspect, or any means of de-
tecting the presence of the dangerous quality except by a
chemical analysis. . . . There is no evidence that he or his agents
knew that the whisky contained wood alcohol, or that they were
guilty of negligence in handling or selling it. According to the
proof in the case the bottles were filled from the demijohns in
which he purchased the whisky, and it was sold in the condition
in which he bought it." 24 The wholesaler is almost invulnerable
to suit by the consumer as long as he remains purely a distribu-
tor.
Of course, where an injured consumer is in a position to
maintain an action against the retailer or the manufacturer of
the goods which caused his injury, there is little reason for his
contemplating an action against the wholesaler.
However, if circumstances are such as to make an action
against the retailer or the manufacturer inadvisable, it may
be that an action against the wholesaler is the injured con-
sumer's only feasible source of recovery. For example, the
retailer may be execution-proof, as with a corner grocer
23 Cornelius v. B. Filippone & Co., Inc., 119 N. J. L. 540, 197 A. 647, 648
(1938). See also: DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447,
100 S. W. 2d 336 (1937); Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N. H. 200, 177 A. 656
(1935); Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 App. Div. 278, 38 N. Y. S.
2d 788 (1st Dept. 1942); Duncan v. Juman, 25 N. J. Super. 330, 96 A. 2d 415(1953); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 85 R. I. 51, 112 A. 2d 701
(1955); Bowman Biscuit Company of Texas v. Hines, op. cit. supra n. 18.
24 Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 A. 510, 515 (1916). See also: Elmore
v. Grenada Grocery Co., 189 Miss. 370, 197 S. 761 (1940); Cornelius v. B.
Filippone & Co., Inc., op. cit. supra n. 23; Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
op. cit. supra n. 23; Singer v. Zabelin, 24 N. Y. S. 2d 962 (N. Y. City Ct.
1941); Hamson v. Standard Grocery Company, 328 Mas. 263, 103 N. E. 2d
233 (1952).
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operating on a hand-to-mouth basis, or the manufacturer
may be a non-resident of the state unwilling to submit to
local jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the whole-
saler may remain the sole possible source of recovery. In
other situations, the particular position of the wholesaler
may make him a more attractive defendant than the retailer
or the manufacturer. Thus, the large wholesaler owning a
famous brand-name is a prime target for consumer claims,
since his financial condition is usually good, and he is
particularly vulnerable in wishing to avoid unflattering
publicity.
25
The consumer who chooses to bring an action against a
wholesaler for injury resulting from defective goods may pro-
ceed in tort, where negligence is almost always alleged, or in
contract for breach of warranty (usually implied warranty of
quality). The consumer-plaintiff will proceed according to the
available remedy which may best be adapted to his case, since
in practice the measure of damages is substantially the same.
"Where the goods fall short of the warranted quality, the usual
measure of the buyer's damage when he sues in contract on the
warranty, unless a greater loss appears, is the difference between
the value of the goods when delivered, and their value if they
had been as represented .... This same measure will be applied
by most courts if the buyer chooses, as he often may do, to sue
in tort for misrepresentation of the quality of the goods." 26 A
breach of warranty action is more attractive to an injured con-
sumer than is a negligence action because he needs only to
establish that the warranty existed and that its breach caused
his injury. "The drawback to the warranty action is simply that
to date, the great majority of states have refused to allow a
warranty action by the consumer against the wholesaler because
of lack of privity. In an action based upon a theory of negligence,
on the other hand, not only must the plaintiff establish that the
wholesaler in dealing with the goods owes him a duty of due
care, but the plaintiff must also prove that it was the whole-
saler's failure to exercise such due care which caused the in-
jury. Proving this element of fault-the failure to exercise due
care-and establishing its causal connection to the plaintiff's in-
jury often causes great difficulty." 27
25 Note, 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. 380, 382.
26 McCormick, Damages, Secs. 176, 672 (1935); Oleck, Damages To Persons
and Property, Secs. 253, 254 (1957 revision).
27 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. op. cit. supra n. 25.
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Wholesaler's Liability for Negligence
Where a wholesaler sells goods in such a manner as to make
it appear that he is the manufacturer, he may be found liable to
the consumer not only for his own negligence, but also for that
of the manufacturer, which the wholesaler is said to assume.
"One who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured
by another is subject to the same liability as though he were
its manufacturer." 2s In a 1910 case it was held, "We believe
the law is and should be that where a person selling an article
represents to the purchaser that it is wholesome and pure, and
that it is good to take into the human system, and it is proven
that the representation was false, and that the article was a
deadly poison, dangerous to human life, and that a person,
relying upon the statement, purchases the article and uses it
for the purposes for which it has been sold and is injured there-
by, the seller should be liable, as a matter of law." 29 The whole-
saler's representation that the goods are his own product raises a
vicarious liability for the acts of the manufacturer. This liability
arises most commonly when the wholesaler sells, under his own
private brand name, goods made by another. When qualifying
words appear on the label, such as "packed for" or "distributor,"
or when the name of the manufacturer is printed in small letters
on a label which is clearly that of the wholesaler, the question
arises as to when such language is sufficient to preserve the
seller's position as a wholesaler.
In Swift & Co. v. Blackwel,3 the Swift company was held
liable in negligence for defective food packed for Swift by Libby.
Although the word "Distributor" followed the Swift name in
small letters on the can, the word "Swift" was emphasized else-
where on the can and in the advertising. The court felt that an
over-all impression that the product was a Swift product and
that it was manufactured by Swift was given. "By putting a
chattel out as his own product he induces reliance upon his care
in making it; therefore, he is liable if, because of some negligence
in its fabrication or through lack of proper inspection during
the process of manufacture, the article is in a dangerously de-
28 Restatement, Torts, 400 (1934).
29 Darks v. Scudders-Gale Grocer Co., 146 Mo. App. 246, 130 S. W. 430, 436
(1910). See also: Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 270 Mass. 593, 108
N. E. 474 (1915); Dolly v. Holly Manufacturing Co., 49 C. 2d 720, 321 P. 2d
736 (1958).
80 84 F. 2d 130 (C. C. A. 4, 1936).
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fective condition which he could not discover after it was de-
livered to him. The rule applies only where the chattel is so
put out as to lead those who use it to believe that it is the
product of him who puts it out, but the fact that it is sold under
the name of the person selling it may be sufficient to induce such
a belief." 31 It is not clear whether the words "packed for" are
a better protection to the seller.3 2
The identification of the wholesaler with the particular
product is not so obvious where the name of the brand is not the
name of the wholesaler. "The Leggett Company selected a
packer to supply it with products. Through advertising and
other means it publicized the name 'Premier'; it put this trade-
name, with the words 'The Guarantee of Quality,' on the can of
peas; it put its own name on the can adding the word 'Distribu-
tor'; nowhere on the can is the name of any other person as
canner, nor is there any definite statement that the defendant is
not in fact the canner. It might be both canner and distributor.
It is fair to say that its conduct has been such that it might be
held to have adopted this product as its own and to have made
itself responsible for the acts of the undisclosed packer of its
own selection." 33 The court held the defendant liable for the
manufacturer's negligence. A Georgia court reached the oppo-
site conclusion because the evidence did not show that the
brand name was the defendant's. However, it granted the plain-
tiff a new trial, saying: "We do think, however, that, since the
evidence is undisputed that the article was actually handled by
the defendant, it was incumbent on it to exculpate itself to the
extent of showing that it had in good faith procured it from some
reputable manufacturer, distributor, or dealer, as an article
reasonably safe for the use intended especially so since there is
nothing on the package to indicate who, as manufacturer or
packer, was ultimately responsible for the alleged tort." 34
It has been suggested that mere ownership of the brand
should be enough to support liability. This is based on the as-
31 Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 A. 385, 391 (1932).
32 Compare Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 177 Md. 393, 9 A. 2d 572 (1940) where
the wholesaler was held liable in negligence, with DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee
Mercantile Co., op. cit. supra n. 23, where the wholesaler was excused.
33 Slavin v. Francis H. Leggett & Co., 114 N. J. L. 421, 177 A. 120, 121
(1935), affd. 117 N. J. L. 101, 186 A. 832 (1936). See also: Swift and Com-
pany v. Blackwell, op. cit. supra n. 30.
34 Fleetwood v. Swift & Co., 27 Ga. App. 502, 506, 108 S. E. 909, 911 (1921).
See also: Swift and Company v. Blackwell, op. cit. supra n. 30.
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sumption that the large wholesaler who brands others' products
as his own is able to gain market control through integration of
manufacturing and marketing. Such a wholesaler is apt to
control production and even maintain an inspector at the manu-
facturing plant. "Such a view puts the same economic evaluation
on a branding wholesaler as it does on a manufacturer. It as-
sumes that there is a substantial correlation between brand
ownership and economic domination of the channels of manu-
facturing and distribution. It implies that in these situations
liability should ultimately rest on the wholesaler, not the offend-
ing manufacturer. No court has rested liability on this ground." 35
The wholesaler who neither claims to be the manufacturer
nor owns the brand may still be a useful object of liability in
making the manufacturer more accessible to the consumer. "The
wholesaler short cut reduces circuity of action and, to the same
extent, removes the risk that intermediate financial irresponsi-
bility or physical remoteness will break the chain of actual ac-
countability." 36 In Ellis v. Lindmark,37 a drug company was
found to be negligent in sending a barrel of raw linseed oil to a
retail druggist in response to an order for a barrel of cod liver oil.
The druggist sold it to the plaintiffs who were poultry raisers.
The wholesaler's liability for his own negligence arises from
his "failure to use due care in discharging the following duties:
(1) the duty to purchase goods from reputable manufacturers;
(2) the duty to do no act which renders the goods potentially
harmful; (3) the duty to inspect the goods for defects; (4) the
duty to warn of a deleterious condition in the goods of which the
wholesaler has knowledge." 38
Wholesaler's Liability for Breach of Warranty
An action for breach of implied warranty of quality is a
more attractive means of recovery for the injured consumer-
plaintiff than a negligence action, because fault does not need to
be proved in order to recover. It is difficult, however, to estab-
lish the existence of such an implied warranty against whole-
salers with whom there has been no contractual dealing; privity
is still a requirement in actions for breach of a sales warranty
35 Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer, 146-147 (1951).
36 Ibid., 147.
37 Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Min. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (1929).
38 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. op. cit. supra n. 25, 385.
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in virtually all jurisdictions. "The traditional expression has
been that implied warranties, as well as express warranties, do
not run with the goods to sub-vendees; hence, no privity of
contract, no warranty." 39
As we have seen in another section of this symposium, the
privity requirement in implied warranty actions by injured con-
sumers against food manufacturers has been discarded or
avoided in a small but growing number of states. However, in
regard to actions by consumers against food wholesalers for
breach of implied warranty of quality, only in Kansas has the
privity requirement expressly been discarded. "It cannot be
clearly determined from the relatively small number of reported
cases whether in setting aside the privity requirement the courts
have made any distinction between wholesalers and manufac-
turers, by requiring privity in actions by consumers against the
one and discarding it in similar actions against the other." 40 For
example, in Missouri, a lower court has dropped privity as
against the manufacturer, 41 although it has retained it as against
the wholesaler. 42 In states that have allowed actions for breach
of implied warranty by consumers against food manufacturers
regardless of privity, it may be that actions against food whole-
salers may be permitted on the same basis.
In the 1933 Kansas case of Challis v. Hartloff, a consumer
sued a retailer, a "broker," and a manufacturer. The court held
that the plaintiff's suit against the manufacturer was barred by
the statute of limitations. In reaching this result it said that the
warranty obligations of the retailer and "broker" (against
whom the action was timely) were separate from the warranty
obligation of the manufacturer (against whom the action was
not timely) and could not be used as a basis for sustaining the
suit against the manufacturer. The court found that the "broker"
could be found liable for violation of the implied warranty. "As
to the liability of the broker, he not having any direct dealings
with the plaintiff, and (in view of) his defense of the three-year
statute of limitations, it may be said he made the sale of flour to
the retail dealer with the same implied warranty and with the
full knowledge and definite understanding that the retailer
39 Ibid., 393.
40 Ibid., 394.
41 Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90
S. W. 2d 445 (Kansas City, Mo. Ct. of App. 1936).
42 DeGouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., op. cit. supra n. 23,
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would in turn sell it to the plaintiff, or some other consumer,
whereby human life and health would be involved by its in-
tended use. He is liable under this implied warranty not only to
his dealer but also to the purchaser of the flour from the deal-
er." 43 A broker is normally an agent of the seller, without title
to the goods. To hold such a seller liable in warranty, especially
where there is no privity of contract, would extend the con-
sumer's civil protection about as far as it can go.
Five years later, the Kansas Supreme Court, relying to a
great extent upon Challis v. Hartloif, held a wholesaler liable
directly to a consumer for breach of warranty of sauerkraut
juice, despite the facts that the product was packed by Libby, the
label was Libby's and not the defendant's, there was no privity
of contract between the defendant and the consumer, and the
product was packed in a sealed can, impervious to inspection.
The court said, "It seems illogical to hold that the injured con-
sumer might maintain an action against the immediate seller or
the manufacturer or packer, but not against the intermediate
purchasers and sellers of the articles of food. To so hold would
mean that if the immediate seller were financially irresponsible,
and the packer, for instance, were located in a foreign country,
the injured consumer would, from a practical standpoint, be
without remedy." 44
In 1954, the Kansas Supreme Court took an even bigger step
in Graham v. Bottenfteld's, Inc.,45 where it allowed the plaintiff
to recover for injuries sustained from the use of a hair prepara-
tion, known as "Miss Clairol." The defendant was a distributor.
The fact that a hair preparation was involved, not foodstuffs,
represents a considerable extension of the doctrine rejecting the
privity requirement.
"In summation, in the vast majority of jurisdictions the lack
of privity of contract stands as a bar to breach of warranty ac-
tions by injured consumers against wholesalers. Only in Kansas,
where both food wholesalers and cosmetic wholesalers have been
43 Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kans. 823, 18 P. 2d 199, 203 (1933).
44 Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kans. 555, 561, 77 P. 2d
930, 935 (1938). See also: Sharp v. Pittsburgh Coca Cola Bottling Co., 180
Kan. 845, 308 P. 2d 150 (1957); Simmons v. Wichita Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
181 Kan. 35, 309 P. 2d 633 (1957); Bowman Biscuit Company of Texas v.
Hines, op. cit. supra n. 18.
45 176 Kans. 68, 269 P. 2d 413 (1954); Simmons v. Wichita Coca Cola Bottling
Co., op. cit. supra n. 44.
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found liable for breach of warranty, has the privity requirement
been relaxed so as to allow recovery by the consumer." 46
From the above, it can be seen that when injured consumers
have chosen to seek recovery from the wholesalers of goods
which have caused them harm, they have generally brought ac-
tions for negligence or for breach of implied warranty of quality.
The consumers have been most successful in negligence actions
against wholesalers where they have not had to prove fault in
the wholesaler in order to recover. Recovery is, of course, more
difficult when some degree of fault must be shown in the whole-
saler, since the wholesaler's function is usually only to handle
the goods with little opportunity to cause the commodities to be
deleterious.
Only in one state, Kansas, have actions by consumers against
wholesalers for breach of implied warranty of quality been suc-
cessful. In other states, the lack of contractual privity has been
held to bar breach of warranty actions by consumers against
wholesalers.
46 1955 Wash. U. L. Q. op. cit. supra n. 25, at 396.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/6
